Among moral attributes true virtue alone is sublime. … [I]t is only by means of this idea [of virtue] that any judgment as to moral worth or its opposite is possible. … Everything good that is not based on a morally good disposition … is nothing but pretence and glittering misery. 1.

This is the first book-length study in any language to examine in detail and critically assess the second part of Kant's ethics- -an empirical, impure part, which determines how best to apply pure principles to the human situation. Drawing attention to Kant's under-explored impure ethics, this revealing investigation refutes the common and long-standing misperception that Kants ethics advocates empty formalism. Making detailed use of a variety of Kantian texts never before translated into English, author Robert B. Louden reassesses the (...) strengths and weaknesses of Kantian ethics as a whole, once the second part is re-admitted to its rightful place within Kant's practical philosophy. (shrink)

In Overdoing Democracy, Robert B. Talisse turns the popular adage "the cure for democracy's ills is more democracy" on its head. Indeed, he argues, the widely recognized, crisis-level polarization within contemporary democracy stems from the tendency among citizens to overdo democracy. When we make everything--even where we shop, the teams we cheer for, and the coffee we drink--about our politics, we weaken our bonds to one another, and work against the fundamental goals of democracy. Talisse advocates civic friendship built (...) around shared endeavors that we must undertake with fellow citizens who do not necessarily share our political affinities as the best way we can obtain a healthier, more sustainable democracy. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of a paper by Robert Lipkin [1]. Arguments for the following claims are put forward: (1) that what is essential to the psychiatric relationship is what we want it to be for utilitarian reasons; (2) it would not be to our advantage to allow the medicalization of morality; (3) what we should expect from the psychiatrist is prudential advice, not moral advice, and that Lipkin has a confused view about the relationship between these two (...) areas; and (4) we should not allow the psychiatrist to restrict individuals on moral grounds, but only on public safety grounds. (shrink)

We desperately need to know more of the biological details of the onset and progression of breast cancer. The disease is of startlingly high incidence (approaching 1 in 9 women), our current therapies for the disease are inadequate once it has metastasized, and the disease is characterized by excessive morbidity and mortality.Most of the growth and differentiation of the mammary gland occurs relatively late in life: during sexual maturation, and then cyclically during pregnancy and lactation. Normal as well as malignant (...) growth is regulated by endocrine hormones as well as by local tissue factors, such as polypeptide growth factors, Cancer seems to progress as hyperplastic ductal or lobular epithelial growth, acquiring progressive genetic changes (including those of oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes) leading to clonal outgrowths of progressively more malignant cells. The nature of proliferative controls and the relevant genetic changes are the subjects of the current review. (shrink)

In Kant's Human Being, Robert B. Louden continues and deepens avenues of research first initiated in his highly acclaimed book, Kant's Impure Ethics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Charles AltieriRobert B. PippinIam very grateful to Charles Altieri for his attentive reading of and thoughtful critique of Philosophy by Other Means: The Arts in Philosophy and Philosophy in the Arts.1 Let me proceed immediately to his main and quite important criticism of the approach defended there. It is this: "My one huge problem with Pippin's perspective is that I cannot accept his insistence that the (...) distinctive form of thinking elicited by works of art is best treated as a mode of knowledge." And he offers a contrasting perspective: "Instead I propose that art should matter to society primarily as the achievement of constructed, specific, individual experiences that embody resonance and authority. Then we can claim that their capacities to engage audiences in particular imaginative situations dramatically stage responses to the historical conditions on which Pippin dwells." This is a densely stated alternative, and I am not sure I fully understand it or why stating it this way thereby shows why art "should matter to society" (art may do this, but why is that important?), but I have much to say by way of clarification before getting to the alternative.First, I meant the title to be as dialectical and so as paradoxical as it sounds. If the means are "other," then we have left philosophy altogether; if the other means are still philosophical, then they can't count as "other." By dialectical I mean simply the avoidance of such dualisms, while not collapsing distinctions through some sort of resolutive reductionism. The idea is to avoid two terrible examples of philosophical approaches to the arts that putatively avoid such dualisms: either provocative or illustrative. The former sees literature especially as embodying issues like moral dilemmas that can be understood to pose, to provoke, philosophical [End Page 249] questions that traditional philosophy should then take up and discuss on its own. (Examples are the way Samuel Beckett's plays, or Albert Camus's The Stranger, are sometimes taught.) The latter, the illustrative, sees literature, again paradigmatically, as providing something like the flesh and blood of abstract philosophical issues, instantiating and illustrating a particular philosophical approach, like moral sentimentalism. (Charles Dickens is often cited.)These are surely examples of what Altieri cites as, and quite rightly rejects, as "appropriating those [aesthetic] experiences for philosophical explanation." I want to reject such "appropriationism" too. In my first chapter, on philosophical criticism of the arts, the idea I defended was that attention to the philosophical value of literature (I will stay with this art form for a while) is attention to literature as a form of reflective thinking itself, in no need of appropriation by philosophy—even though, I claim, there can be a form of philosophical criticism. The point of such criticism is to illuminate that dimension of the work itself, something philosophically significant that the work can do but traditional philosophy cannot.This is couched within several qualifications. Such attentiveness can be valuable, but not for just any work of great literature. Some literature is great without being concerned with any aesthetic modality of "thinking." One can surely admire Samuel Richardson or Anthony Trollope or William Makepeace Thackeray and admit that their value stems from other qualities in the prose, plotting, and psychologically astute portrayal of characters. And for many other reasons, any of the arts can be said to be valuable even if a case can also be made for their bearing on philosophy.And finally, the concept of "philosophical knowledge" is quite complicated. Surely some philosophers, like G. W. F. Hegel, believe in such a thing, but I don't. As Altieri rightly points out, no Absolute exists. What interests me is the relevance of Hegel's claim that a sensible and affective modality of collective self-knowledge can be embodied in many great works. But the collective self-knowledge embodied in fiction is not like discursive or analytic or even speculative knowledge. I see no strict distinction between the object of interrogation and the interrogation itself. That is, the "self" in question (e.g., who have we become?) is what it is by virtue of its own self-interpretation. Self-knowledge in... (shrink)

The 1963 publication in English of Leo Strauss's study of Xenophon's dialogue, Hiero, or Tyrannicus, also contained a critical review of Strauss's interpretation by the French philosopher and civil servant, Alexandre Kojève, and a "Restatement" of his position by Strauss. This odd triptych, with a complex statement of the classical position on tyranny in the middle, Strauss's defense of classical philosophy on one side, and Kojève's defense of a radically historicist, revolutionary Hegel on the other, has now been re-edited and (...) re-published. Victor Gourevitch and Michael Roth have added all the extant letters between Strauss and Kojève written between 1932 and 1965, many of which continue and deepen the exchanges on Xenophon first published in French in 1954. The editors have also reviewed and corrected the translation of Xenophon, and re-translated Kojève's review.The Strauss-Kojève exchange raises several fundamental questions: the relationship between political philosophy and underlying assumptions about time and history ; the nature of our independence from, and dependence on, others in any satisfaction of desire; and the right way to understand the distinctive character of modern, as opposed to classical, political life and thought. I attempt to asses their respective positions on these and other issues, and argue that the nature of the debate between them is seriously and problematically constrained by the way Kojève's reading of Hegel frames much of the discussion. (shrink)

Robert Talisse argues that skepticism is required for a healthy democracy, and provides some illuminating and amusing examples of popular dismissive attitudes towards skepticism.

Democracy is not only a form of government. It is also the moral aspiration for a society of self-governing political equals who disagree about politics. Citizens are called on to be active democratic participants, but they must also acknowledge one another's political equality. Democracy thus involves an ethic of civility among opposed citizens. Upholding this ethic is more difficult than it may look. When the political stakes are high, the opposition seems to us tobe advocating injustice. Sustaining Democracy poses the (...) question: why should we uphold democratic relations with those whose politics we despise? (shrink)

What sort of thing is judgment?1 Looking at the sense of "judgment" as a human capacity as opposed to the result of exercising that capacity, whether in ordinary behavior or in some legal or political framework, I intend to offer a definition proposal for the term and then to discuss how judgment so defined operates in human behavior, what constitutes good judgment, whether it can be cultivated, and, if so, how. The example I will focus on is drawn from Shakespeare's (...) character Benedick in Much Ado About Nothing as he decides to fall in love with Beatrice. Postulating that Shakespeare is a shrewd analyst of human psychology, I hope to show that his portrayal will illuminate the concept of judgment and, conversely... (shrink)

Abstract:Can I (and you) talk sensibly about William Shakespeare's works? Some historicists see insuperable barriers in trying to understand utterances from different times and cultures, and some skeptics see such barriers in trying to read other minds. In Ludwig Wittgenstein's famous utterance about not understanding a talking lion, is the early modern Englishman Shakespeare one of those lions? Or can a magic key see past such barriers in one of the critical systems that we are offered? I argue that the (...) answer to both questions is no. (shrink)

This 2002 book was the first English translation of Friedrich Schleiermacher's mature ethical theory. Situated between the better-known positions of Kant and Hegel, Schleiermacher's ethics represents an under-explored and singular option within the rich and creative tradition of German idealism. Schleiermacher is known to English readers primarily as a theologian and hermeneuticist, but many German scholars have argued that it is in fact his philosophical work in ethics that constitutes his most outstanding intellectual achievement. The lectures, which were not published (...) in his lifetime, are thought to span the years 1812–17 and address such topics as ethics as a descriptive science, ethics as a study of the action of reason on nature, and doctrines of goods, virtue, and duties. This volume presents them in an accessible new translation by Louise Adey Huish, together with an introduction by Robert Louden that sets them in context and assesses their achievement. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7.

In the following, I want to suggest two different ways of understanding the relation between Kant's Critique of Judgment and the later German Idealist tradition. Commentators have long noted the point d'appui for any interpretation of this relation: Kant's remarks about an “intuitive intellect” (for him a divine, or creative intellect), and the interpretations of this doctrine offered by schelling (see Article 5) and hegel (Article 6). The first interpretation I want to consider might be called the received or standard (...) view about that relation. I shall summarize it in sections I and II below. Roughly, according to this view, what Kant proposed as a mere regulative doctrine, of no central importance in the third Critique, was inflated by Schelling and Hegel, in a philosophically unjustifiable way, into a positive metaphysical claim about reality itself as a self‐positing divine mind. (shrink)

This fresh and original book argues that the central questions in Hegel's practical philosophy are the central questions in modern accounts of freedom: What is freedom, or what would it be to act freely? Is it possible so to act? And how important is leading a free life? Robert Pippin argues that the core of Hegel's answers is a social theory of agency, the view that agency is not exclusively a matter of the self-relation and self-determination of an individual (...) but requires the right sort of engagement with and recognition by others. Using a detailed analysis of key Hegelian texts, he develops this interpretation to reveal the bearing of Hegel's claims on many contemporary issues, including much-discussed core problems in the liberal democratic tradition. His important study will be valuable for all readers who are interested in Hegel's philosophy and in the modern problems of agency and freedom. (shrink)

Hegel frequently claimed that the heart of his entire system was a book widely regarded as among the most difficult in the history of philosophy, The Science of Logic. This is the book that presents his metaphysics, an enterprise that he insists can only be properly understood as a “logic,” or a “science of pure thinking.” Since he also wrote that the proper object of any such logic is pure thinking itself, it has always been unclear in just what sense (...) such a science could be a “metaphysics.” -/- Robert B. Pippin offers here a bold, original interpretation of Hegel’s claim that only now, after Kant’s critical breakthrough in philosophy, can we understand how logic can be a metaphysics. Pippin addresses Hegel’s deep, constant reliance on Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics, the difference between Hegel’s project and modern rationalist metaphysics, and the links between the “logic as metaphysics” claim and modern developments in the philosophy of logic. Pippin goes on to explore many other facets of Hegel’s thought, including the significance for a philosophical logic of the self-conscious character of thought, the dynamism of reason in Kant and Hegel, life as a logical category, and what Hegel might mean by the unity of the idea of the true and the idea of the good in the “Absolute Idea.” The culmination of Pippin’s work on Hegel and German idealism, no Hegel scholar or historian of philosophy will want to miss this book. (shrink)

In the accompanying article contributed by Robert B. Lawson, proposals are made for revising the curriculum for doctoral students in biology in order to enhance a transdisciplinary awareness of biological science. The article is written mainly in the context of Dr Lawson's role as a scientist and educator in the United States. BioEssays will welcome articles along similar lines from educators in other countries. These should be sent to the Staff Editor, Dr Adam S. Wilkins.